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Abstract
In this paper, we aim to integrate findings from the fields of machine learning and network science to argue
that organisms can be modeled as hierarchical Bayesian control systems with small world and bottleneck
(bow tie network structure. The nested hierarchical organization of such networks allows organisms to form
increasingly integrated percepts and concepts of their inner and outer context, which can be compared to
increasingly encompassing predictive models of the world (goal states), to allow for an optimal control of
actions. We argue that hierarchical Bayesian inference produces a hierarchy of goal states, from which it
follows that organismsmust have some form of ‘highest goals’. For all organisms, these predictive models
involve interior (self) models, exterior (social) models and overarching (normative) models. We show how
such goals are constructed from progressively lesser goal states and that goal hierarchies tend to decompose
in a top-downmanner under severe and prolonged levels of stress. This loss of high-level control leads to
a disinhibition of subordinate hierarchical levels, producing ‘critical’ behavior and tipping points (a sudden
loss of homeostasis). Such phase transitions amount either to disease or the death of the organism. This
model can be used tomodel organisms of any type, including humans. In humans, learning higher-level world
models corresponds to personality development. A top-down collapse of high-level integrative goal states
under stress is identified as a common factor in all forms of mental disease (psychopathology). The paper
concludes by discussing ways of testing these hypotheses empirically.
1 Artificial and biological systems
For centuries, scientists have attempted to discover natural laws that govern the structure and
function of living systems. This eort is now producing some interesting results due to theoretical
advances, the advent of high-throughput datasets and a huge increase in computing power [98].
Currently, the field still shows a global division between biological and computer sciences, which
represents a fundamental distinction in theway theproblemhasbeenapproached todate, i.e. either
by studying living systems themselves (e.g. biology, genetics, biochemistry) or by studying artificial
versions of them (e.g. engineering, computer science and robotics). Below, we will first discuss
progress in the fields of artificial systems and biological systems separately. We will thenmerge
insights from both fields to produce a general theory on living systems and the way they respond
to stress. We highlight the universality of this response along with its applicability in humans, and
conclude by discussing methods to test the model empirically.
2 Artificial systems
2.1 Organisms as control systems
Artificial intelligence has now come to a point where computers are able to reach (super)human
level performance in complex tasks without prior instructions [136, 173, 179]. The basis for this
1
achievement lies in the beginning of the 20th century, when cyberneticists began to model or-
ganisms as (perceptual) control systems [6, 33, 34, 156]. Such systemsmaintain internal stability
despite changes in environmental conditions by generating some kind of output (O) that aims
tomatch the current input state (I) with a desired or anticipated throughput state (T; a reference
value or setpoint). In engineering, control systems are used e.g. in central heating systems, which
aim to maintain a stable room temperature despite environmental fluctuations by controlling
the radiator. This is done using a control system that compares the current room temperature
to that of the thermostat. The dierence between the two (the error) is transferred in some form
to the radiator, which tries to close the gap between the desired and actual room temperatures
by emitting heat. Many studies have shown that organisms behave in similar ways [25, 156], see
Figure 1. Organisms use their input-parts (senses) to monitor the state of their environment and
compare their input state to a reference state located within a throughput (evaluation) part. Output
(behavior) is then generated until the input matches the setpoint. This helps organisms to find
an optimal environmental niche. For example, motor activity in woodlice is varied randomly and
drops to zero only when humidity levels reach near 100% (a setpoint). As a result, woodlice keep
running around erratically until they hit upon a wet place, which is why we find these creatures in
all sorts of nooks and crannies. This behavior helps woodlice prevent desiccation andmakes them
invisible to predators [198].
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Figure 1. Organisms canbemodeled as control systems that consist of an input node I (a sensor), a throughput
nodeT (a setpoint) and an output node O (an eector), which are connected by links that symbolize the
possibility of energy exchange between these nodes. Arrows show the direction of energy flow, colors indicate
positive or negative relationships (red: negative, blue: positive). The sensory node I has a state i (t ) that is
changed as a result of a stimulus s(t ) from the environmentC (context), which is in a changing state c(t ). The
state i (t ) of the sensory node I is sampled by an aerent connection and the resulting state a(t ) is compared
to (i.e. subtracted from) the stateT (t ) of a throughput nodeT (the setpoint or reference node). The dierence
(error e(t )) between the two states is passed on by eerent connections to the output nodeO (in state o(t )),
which generates the corrective response r (t ) to the environmentC , and so on. External disturbances of the
environment C are modeled by d (t ). The setpoint of the systemT can be reset by the output from higher
level control systems, see text.
Seminal work by Powers showed that biological systems vary their output freely until the state
of the input node I matches a reference value. Their behavior thus serves to keep a percept (some
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environmental condition) within certain limits. Woodlice probably have no clue as to where exactly
in the garden they can find a particular crevasse, aer which they engage in a carefully controlled
output sequence that is aimed at reaching the desired spot. Instead, they just stumble upon a
dark and wet place that produces the kind of sensor-output that makes motor activity drop to zero.
Since organisms control their input (percepts) by means of their output (behavior), this type of
control is called ‘perceptual control’ [156]. Perceptual control is highly pragmatic: rather than the
specific actions, it’s the end-result that counts. By freely ‘emitting behavior’ [181] until a desired
eect is obtained, organisms can come upwith a number of dierent solutions to the same problem
(e.g. running and hiding in crevasses, rolling up, or digging in all prevent desiccation). This adds
flexibility and creativity to the production of behavior [157]. The advantages of perceptual control
have been demonstrated in a number of experiments. For instance, robots that run on perceptual
control systems can be pushed o their feet in many dierent ways yet remain stable, whereas
robots that run solely on action-control systems can correct their position only in a limited number
of ways and tip over [223].
2.2 Organisms as hierarchical control systems
Wiring diagrams such as Figure 1 can only produce rather simple behavior, such as themovement of
woodlice. Such diagrams require an extension in order to explain more complex forms of behavior.
This includes the formation of specific sequences of actions that allow organisms to accomplish
certain tasks. For instance, making a cup of coee involves a number of simple subtasks (primitives)
that need to be placed in a particular order in order to succeed (e.g. heating water, grabbing a cup,
pouring hot water over cherned coeebeans, pouring the coee into a cup, adding milk or sugar,
et cetera; [23]). Such output sequences can bemore or less eicient depending on the order and
the number of recursions in which the subtasks appear [37, 184]. Powers showed that perceptual
control systems can produce action sequences (behavior) by allowing their setpoints to be reset by
the output of other (higher level) control systems and so on, yielding a hierarchy of control systems
[157, 158, 156]. This hierarchy is symbolized in Figure 1 by the input r ′(t ) to the setpoint nodeT .
This is the output of a higher level control system that is superposed on top of the control system
shown in this figure. Figure 2 shows amore elaborate example of a hierarchical perceptual control
system.
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Figure 2. Classical example of an artificial hierarchical control system, which involves the stacking of one
control system on top of another, to produce multiple levels of control. This can be compared to the stacking
of one array of thermostats on top of another in order to better control temperature fluctuations in the
environment. The output of higher level control systems canmodify the setpoints of subordinate systems
(and so on) to produce ordered sequences of simple actions (primitives), which we call behavior.
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The idea that a hierarchy of (higher order) control systems continuously updates the setpoints
of low-level systems (action primitives) is known as the equilibrium setpoint hypothesis for motor
control [52]. In hierarchical action control, primitives can be compared to individual musical notes
that are are activated in parallel (‘chords’) or in dierent sequences in order to produce the ‘music’
of behavior. Studies of hierarchical action control show that action sequences do not require a
strict correspondence with the hierarchical wiring of the control system (i.e. we do not engage in
a fully hierarchically controlled sequence of coee-making actions that is spat out from the very
beginning of grabbing coee beans to sipping from the cup; [100]. Rather, organisms produce
intermittent bursts of hierarchically organized action sequences that are updated by a repeated
sampling of the environment (action–perception cycles) [23]. This is comparable with a musician
looking up and down at the scroll sheet every now and then to keep track of the piece. This
account of action control remains consistent with perceptual control in the sense that organisms
use their (hierarchically organized) action sequences to eventually control their input states. Similar
hierarchically organized control systems have been used in e.g. robotics [27].
Since Powers, wiring diagrams of control systems have been modified to explain more complex
forms of behavior. Muchprogress came from studies of reinforcement learning (also termed operant
conditioning, which added the elements of memory and prediction to control systems [91, 197]).
Such systems update their ‘policy’ (input–output strategy) depending on the expected reward of
some action. The expected reward (a prediction) is encoded by the setpoints of these systems,
of which the state represents the actual reward or value obtained aer a previous action (i.e. a
memory). These setpoints are continuously reset (updated) as a function of previous outcomes,
keeping track of the values thatmaximized reward in thepast. Thus, reinforcement learning systems
iteratively learn the policies that maximize long-term cumulative reward. Whereas earlier systems
made no detailed models of the environments they live in (so calledmodel-free systems), later
systemswere allowed tomake explicit predictions of theway inwhich certain actionswould change
the input to the system considering previous experiences (model-based systems) [46, 185]). Such
‘world models’ are simulations of ideal actions and their possible outcomes (e.g. where dierent
paths in a maze lead to), which are based on previous actions and their outcomes. Predictive
activity of this type has been compared to the act of planning, imagination, or goal setting, which
is whymodel-based systems are alternatively referred to as goal-directed systems. Model-based
systems require a hierarchical elaboration of their throughput parts, to accommodate complex
predictive models of the world. Such goal states are pursued by hierarchically organized action
sequences until a maximum value has been reached. Studies show that hierarchical model-based
systems such as these outperform hierarchical model-free systems in spatial navigation tasks [24].
In the past decade, goal-directed learning has been applied within the context of artificial
neural networks [173]. Such networks consist of a layer of input nodes that connect to a layer of
throughput nodes (a hidden layer), which in turn connect to a layer of output nodes. When such
systems are trained, the connections within the network are altered until a given input produces a
suitable output. It turns out that the performance of such systems increases significantly when
their throughput parts are extended to include multiple, hierarchically ordered layers of nodes.
Such deep networks can associate raw perceptual input (say, the image of a cat) to a suitable
output (e.g. a label ‘cat’) with remarkable precision. When deep networks are allowed to construct
explicit world models (hierarchical deep belief networks, or deep convolutional systems), their
performance increases even further. Such systems can ‘imagine’ a future and formulate articulated
goal sequences (goals and subgoals) that are pursued bymeans of complex action sequences to
achieve high success rates [141, 151, 159, 221]. The performance of these systems comes close to
what neuroscientists believe is the essential nature of the human brain: an active inference engine,
whose primary job it is to construct dierent models of what is going on in the environment and
to test these models by performing some kind of action out into the environment. These actions
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change the input to the system (via the environment), which serves as a check onmodel evidence
[60]. According to active inference theory, organisms cannot only reduce prediction errors by
varying motor output impacting on percepts (as perceptual control would have it), but also by
updating their world models to produce a better fit with their input states. This ability to ‘change
your mind’ has addedmuch to the field of control theory (see below for a further elaboration of
active inference).
Thus, adding hierarchy to the output parts of control systems allows for the production of
complex action-perception sequences (behavior), whereas adding hierarchy to the throughput
(setpoint) parts further boosts the performance of such systems by producing comprehensive goals
and subgoals. More recently, studies began to apply hierarchical structure to the input layers of
deep networks [136, 180]. The hierarchical structure of perceptive areas had been relatively ignored
in previous studies, despite the fact that this is awell-knownattribute of the cerebral cortex in higher
mammals (e.g. receptive fields in the macaque visual cortex) [79, 165]. Hierarchical perception
allows control systems to extract increasingly abstract patterns and shapes from raw perceptual
input [94, 104, 202]. In 2015, a seminal study was the first to combine hierarchical input (abstract
vision) with hierarchical throughput (abstract goal states) and hierarchical output (abstract action
control) to produce human-level performance in complex visuospatial tasks (playing Atari computer
games) [136]. The system only took raw pixel intensity values as input, aer which it autonomously
produced a complex series of goals and subgoals (e.g. taking elaborate detours through amaze) and
actions sequences (series of jumps and other complexmovements) tomaximize the outcome of the
game (increasing the total score). Similar systems have since shocked the world by beating human
experts in activities as diverse as media classification [180, 206], medical diagnostics [110] and the
game of Go [179] and are quickly finding their way into robotics [199]. In short, history shows that
adding hierarchical structure to the various components of a control system has contributed much
to their enormous success.
As illustrated above, the idea that living systems behave as hierarchical control systems is
hardly new. Despite its firm rooting within the field of psychology and neuroscience, however, the
concept of organisms as hierarchical control systems has been studied largely from the perspective
of engineering and computer science, devoting little attention to the finer details of the architecture
and function of living systems. Conversely, the idea that biological networks can bemodeled as
control systemshas escaped systematic attention in thebiological sciences. In thepast twodecades,
there has been a tremendous increase in our knowledge of the network structure and function of
living systems. This has shown that organisms follow scale invariant rules of network structure and
function that apply universally to all living systems (see below). These insights have only partly
been integrated with the field of machine learning. The purpose of the current paper is to bring
these two influential fields of science further together. Wewill show that all biological systems have
a generic network structure that makes them ideally suited to function as hierarchical Bayesian
control systems. Such systems can extract increasing amounts of contextual information from
their inner and outer environments, construct increasingly articulated goal states and generate
increasingly complex action sequences in order to reach (long-term) goals. We then identify a
universal response of organisms to contextual cues that overtax the ability of a hierarchy of control
systems to correct for environmental disturbances. Such rules can be used to model organisms of
any type, including humans.
3 Biological systems
Network science is booming, ever since the (re)discovery some 20 years ago of the small world
network structure [134, 217] and the subsequent demonstration that universal laws of network
theorygovernnetwork structuresacrossawide rangeofbiological, psychological andsocial systems
[12, 14, 15, 17, 145, 148]. Because of its ability to connect dierent fields of science using a single
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methodology and corresponding terminology, network science holds considerable promise as a
unifying discipline for many dierent fields, including biology, ethology, psychology and sociology.
Below, we will first summarize some of the main findings from translational network science and
identify generic rules of network architecture and function that apply to all living systems. We then
show that this architecture allows biological systems to function as hierarchical Bayesian control
systems and identify a universal response of such structures to extreme forms of stress.
3.1 The structure of biological systems
At some level of abstraction, thewholeof livingnature canbeconsidered to represent the interaction
between building blocks that cluster together to form new building blocks, and so forth, until
complex multicellular life develops [148]. Collections of molecules form organelles, which in turn
formcells, which in turn form tissues, which in turn formorgans, organisms, organizations, biotopes,
and so on. At each scale level of biological organization, the interaction between the building blocks
that exist at this level (be they organelles, cells, organs, or organisms) can be visualized as a network
structure in which building blocks are represented by nodes and their mutual connections by links.
Almost without exception, biological networks show a topological structure called the small world
structure, meaning that most nodes have few connections but some have many (the so-called
hubs; Figure 3). Hubs interconnect the various nodes of the network, allowing any two nodes
in the network to be connected through a small number of intermediate steps, hence the term
‘small world’ (e.g. all people in this world are an average of only 6 degrees of separation apart).
Hubs contract large numbers of nodes into densely connected clusters (also called communities
ormodules; [68, 144]. The nodes that lie within such clusters share more connections amongst
themselves than with other nodes within the network, forming subnetworks of their own. Small
world structures are a general hallmark of biological systems and can be observed throughout
living nature (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Organisms can be conceived of as small world network structures. In such networks, most nodes
have few connections whereas some have many (hubs). Hubs connect all nodes in the network in such a way
that, on average, each node is a small number of intermediate steps away from any other node in the network
(hence the term ‘small world’). In small world networks, hubs contract parts of the network into communities
or modules, which are collections of nodes that share more connections amongst themselves than with other
nodes. Small world networks are known to produce highly eicient ways of information transfer at low wiring
costs with a high tolerance for random damage. They are found in any connectome studied thus far, including
genomes, proteomes, metabolomes, microbiomes, neural connectomes, food webs and social networks.
Small world network structures turn out to be scalable, meaning that network clusters may
themselves serve as nodes in a new network structure at a higher scale level of spatial organization,
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and so on. Thus, biological networks form hierarchies of part-whole relationships, in which higher
levels of organization cannot exist without their constituent lower levels of organization (i.e. they
form conditional dependencies in space [161]). Each new scale level again conforms to a small
world network structure with multimodular features, which is why this architectural principle is
called scale-invariant, or scale-free (Figure 4; [13]). The scale-invariance of network structures has
been compared tomathematical constructs called fractals: self-similar shapes that follow relatively
simple algebraic rules acrossmultiple scale levels of aggregation [67, 187, 186]. Hierarchical network
structures such as these form spontaneously under the right conditions (a constant flux of energy
into open dissipative systems), since such topologies allow network systems to get rid of their
excess energy in the most eicient way, by minimizing resistance to energy flow [89]. A basic
thermodynamic rule therefore suices to produce modular network structures with short and
eicient paths: a phenomenon called self-organization [7, 96]. It has been hypothesized that life
kick-started from networks of chemical reactions, which subsequently adapted to meet the more
complex demands of life [95, 160].
Figure 4. Schematic representation of scale-invariant structure in small world networks. In biological net-
works, hub nodes contract sets of other hub nodes into network clusters. Such clusters may themselves
cluster into superclusters and so on, producing a hierarchy of part–whole relationships. Each cluster may
be represented as a novel node at a higher level of spatial organization (i.e. each node in this figure may
represent a cluster). A small world network topology (see text) is found at each spatial scale level of biological
organization, which iswhy this topological feature it is called ‘scale-invariant’ or, ‘scale-free’. Blue node: central
hub, which connects a set of 6 red nodes (or clusters) into a single network cluster (or supercluster). Red nodes
are themselves hubs that each contract a set of 6 yellow nodes into another network cluster, et cetera. Note
that this process of nested clustering can be repeated almost endlessly (i.e. blue nodes may be drawn into
clusters by high level hub nodes, or green nodes may become hubs by adding nodes). Right picture shows
a side view of the le image in which the vertical position of a node indicates its position within a nested
hierarchy of hub nodes (a rich club; [150])
3.2 The function of biological systems
Biological networks are not just static structures. Energy flows through such structures in the form
of electrons, e.g. chemical reactions at the level of receptors and genes, or electromagnetic changes
at the level of neurons. In small world networks, some parts of the network receive energy (input)
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from the environment and change their states accordingly. These states are altered as they flow
on through the network in ways that depend on the wiring patterns of the nodes andmodules in
that part of the network (throughput). The processed states are then passed on to other nodes
andmodules (output) that lead to some action out into the environment. This succession of state
changes is oen referred to as network ‘function’ (i.e. conditional dependencies in time). Apart
from universal rules of network structure, studies are now beginning to identify rules of network
function that apply across dierent species and scale levels of biological organization [16, 58, 72, 99].
For instance, the input-throughput-output (I/T/O) organization of most biological networks turns
out to resemble the shape of an hourglass, or ‘bow tie’ (Figure 5, le image; [42, 99]). The input
parts of these structures involve multiple input streams converging onto hub structures, which
in turn converge onto higher level hub structures, et cetera, following a hierarchy of part–whole
relationships in an upwardmanner. This goes on until a limited number of high-level hub structures
is reached (i.e. the throughput parts). The output parts then involve multiple outputs diverging
from these throughput hubs onto lower level hub structures and so on, down the nested hierarchy
to the level of individual nodes (Figure 5, right image). For example, a large number of sensory
receptors and corresponding secondmessenger pathways fan in to a relatively small number of
nuclear genes (the waist of the hour glass, or the knot of the bow tie). Multiple outputs then fan
out from these genes in the form of messenger RNAs that instruct a large number of ribosomes
to produce all kinds of proteins that are cleaved into evenmore proteins [15, 216, 226]. A similar
organization can be observed in the human brain [119]. Here, a large number of neural columns
within the visual cortex (coding for color, texture, speed, orientation, et cetera) converge onto a
smaller number of brain areas involved in object representations, which in turn converge onto a
few brain areas coding for global visuospatial scenes. This convergence goes on until anterior and
frontal areas are reached that harbor some of themost global (‘domain general’) representations of
the inner and outer environment (the waist of the hour glass). These global states then bias activity
levels in several subordinate brain areas involved in the planning and execution of motor programs,
which control a multitude of pyramidal cells and muscle fibers to produce motor action [9, 30,
54, 130, 131, 132]. bow tie structures have been observed in the immune system, the internet and
within other bow ties (i.e. bow ties nested within bow ties), making this structure a scale invariant
phenomenon (Box 1) [56, 99, 226].
Box 1: On the structure of organisms: networkmotifs
Biological (small world) networks are made up of smaller building blocks (‘subgraphs’) with a relatively large
scale called network motifs. These are highly generic pieces of network structure that are observed across
dierent spatial scale levels of biological organization, where they support similar functions (e.g. speeding up
or slowing down responses, prolonging responses, integrating or coordinating states, et cetera). The bow tie
structure is just one of these building blocks, with a relatively large size. When examining their finer substruc-
ture, bow ties consist of a family of smaller motifs [2, 4, 108]. Studies have found a particular abundance of the
so-called feedforward loop (FFL) in living systems [2]. This is a motif that consists of only three nodes (A, B,
C) with directed connections between them (i.e. A→B, B→C and A→C). Typically, FFLs lack a connection that
runs from the output of the motif back to its input (i.e. C→A), i.e. they are open-loop control systems. When
confronted with a stimulus, suchmotifs push forward a ‘best guess’ response regardless of its outcome, hence
the term ‘feedforward’. Because of their ability to forward best guess responses, feedforward motifs have
been linked to predictive processing [44]. For instance, the act of eating already increases insulin produc-
tion regardless of actual increase in blood glucose concentration, which involves a predictive feedforward
system [118, 154, 155]. In contrast, feedback motifs contain links that run back from the output nodes to
the input nodes, i.e. they are are closed-loop control systems. Such systems represent events that are the
consequences of certain actions. For example, feedback systems are involved in measuring actual blood
glucose concentrations aer eating, to provide an update on the predictions made by feedforward motifs
[118]. The activity of feedforward and feedback systems needs to be balanced in order to have the best of both
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Figure 5. Le image: organisms can be conceived of as nested hierarchical small world network structures
with a distinct input-throughput-output organization: a bow tie (2D) or hourglass (3D) structure. The input
parts of such networks involve multiple energy streams converging onto each other while ascending in a
hierarchy of part–whole relationships (le part of bow tie). Conversely, the output parts involve multiple
energy streams diverging while descending in the hierarchy (right part of bow tie). The knot of the bow tie (or
the waist of the hourglass) lies in between its input and output parts (i.e. it is a throughput part). This motif
can be observed across multiple scale levels of organization, making it a scale-invariant feature. Right image:
bow tie motifs may show cross-connections (shortcuts) between their input and output parts at dierent
levels within the hierarchy, causing the structure to fold back onto itself (right figure). This allows energy to
travel from input and processing to output structures across loops of various path lengths, corresponding
to dierent degrees of information processing (Figure 6. Please note that arrows in this figure only show the
global direction of energy flow. Feedforward and feedback connections run up and down the various levels of
the hierarchy, which are thought to represent prediction errors and predictions relative to lower-level input
(Box 1, Figure 6.)
worlds. In biological systems, this balance is what underlies hierarchical predictive coding, which requires bow
tie network architecture (see next section, Figure 6). Here, FFL motifs represent the feedforward (descending)
propagation of predictions from higher levels to lower levels within the nested hierarchy, whereas feedback
motifs represent the prediction error that runs back in the opposite (ascending) direction. Thus, feedback
and feedforward loops run up and down the bow tie hierarchy to balance prediction with prediction errors.
The ubiquity of FFLs in living systems suggests that predictive activity makes up a substantial part of these
projections. This corresponds to cumulative findings that organisms are not merely reactive agents but rather
proactive and predictive agents that use memories to predict future events [26, 32, 58, 82, 135, 200]. In short,
the nested hierarchical bottleneck structure of bow tie motifs and their constituent submotifs provide an
optimal infrastructure for hierarchical Bayesian inference. Since bow tie organization is a scale-invariant
feature [99, 226], living systems are wired to function as hierarchical Bayesian control systems at every scale
level of their anatomy [58, 82, 160]. See Box 2 and next section for further information.
The ubiquity of the bow tie motif has sparked questions regarding its functional significance.
Bow ties allow biological networks to convert a host of dierent inputs into a multitude of outputs
using a minimal set of basic operations. Novel inputs and outputs can be easily plugged into a
generic core of hub processes without aecting the system as a whole, making it a highly versatile
structure. Thus, biological networks can combine robustness with adaptability in a chaotic world
full of stimuli [99]. Simulation studies show that hierarchical networks spontaneously evolve bow
tie structure under some restrictions [56]. Resources need to be scarce, and the evolutionary
‘goal’ that these networks aim to satisfy needs to be ‘compressible’, i.e. it should be possible to
represent subordinate goal states by an increasingly small number of higher level variables without
losing toomuch information. This continues until the top of the hierarchy is reached (the knot of
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the bow tie, or the waist of the hourglass). Theminimal width of the bow tie structure therefore
represents the maximum level of compression of an evolutionary goal, with subordinate structures
representing lesser compressed versions of the goal state [56]. As we shall see below, this aspect of
bow ties structures turns out to be rather fundamental: a high-dimensional input is forced through
a bottleneck, or low-dimensional manifold. This relates to the concept of dimensionality reduction
which can be found throughout statistics andmachine learning (e.g. principal component analysis
and other clustering methods [188]). Several studies show that information bottlenecks increase
the performance of hierarchical (deep) networks by allowing for some form of compression and
generalization of events that take place at lower levels [76, 178]. Apparently, a good representation
is a simple representation that minimizes complexity cost and uses the fewest degrees of freedom
to model the environment, i.e. Occam’s principle [116]. Organisms can therefore be conceived of as
dimension reductionmachines that perform a clustering on input in an attempt to find themost
parsimonious representation without losing toomuch information.
In recent years, insights have grown that a nested hierarchical structure does not only allow
organisms to produce more parsimonious descriptions of events that take place at lower levels of
the hierarchy. Rather, higher hierarchical levels appear to represent the hidden causes of the eects
(events, activity) that take place at lower levels of organization. This process is called hierarchical
Bayesian inference [202]. In this view, each level within the hierarchy generates a model of the
hidden causes that produce the eects observed at a lower level. Such generative models perform
well across a limited number of observations and trials and their predictions generalizewell beyond
the subset of training data, suggesting that a certain amount of ‘creativity’ is involved in hierarchical
Bayesian modeling [21, 202]. This property of higher models has been linked to the concept of
emergence in complex systems [74, 123]. The idea that biological organisms engage in an active
form of hierarchical Bayesian inference has produced an explosion of literature in the past decade
(Box 2). So far, however, it has remained largely unclear how this type of processing is implemented
in biological systems. To our knowledge, this is the first time that concepts from network science
and graph theory (i.e. nestedmodular bow tie structures) are put together with message passing
and probabilistic graphical models in hierarchical Bayesian inference, e.g. [64]. Because of their
peculiar network architecture, organisms can combine hierarchical perceptual inference (input)
with hierarchical inference of goal states (throughput) and hierarchical action control (output),
allowing them to function as hierarchical Bayesian control systems. The flow of information across
such structures is not a simple process with energy flowing from input via throughput to output
areas in a linear fashion (Kitano, 2004). Bow tie structures may show cross-connections (shortcuts)
between their input and output parts at dierent levels of the hierarchy, causing the structure
to fold back onto itself (Figure 5, right image). This produces short input–output loops near the
bottom of the hierarchy as well as longer loops that run from input to output along progressively
longer loops, reflecting dierent degrees of processing (Figure 6). Additionally, feedback loops and
feedforward loops run up anddown the hierarchy, reflecting predictive coding aswell as corrections
of such predictions bymeans of novel input (Box 1, Figure 6). Such structures dier fromhierarchical
control systems that are traditionally used in engineering and computer science and come with
specific functionality (Figure 6). This will be discussed in the next section.
Box 2: On the function of organisms: the active inference principle
According to active inference theory, the dynamics of biological systems follows from the basic laws of
thermodynamics, i.e. organisms find their lowest possible energy state despite a continuous influx of energy.
In this view, living systems are statistical engines that encode models of the world simply by reacting to
their input [65]. The dierence between the actual input to the system and some predictive model of the
world corresponds to the prediction error of the system, which under some restrictions corresponds to an
information theoretic quantity called variational free energy. Low prediction error corresponds to a low
Goekoop & De Kleijn | Higher goals from a hierarchical Bayesian control systems perspective 10
number of alternative states that an organism occupies on average and, therefore, a more stable, low-energy
state that has been equated to homeostasis [58]. Suppressing prediction error is therefore an imperative for
all living systems, since it amounts to finding a stable low-energy state. Organisms generally strive towards
this overarching goal by generating a hierarchical series of predictive models (goal states and subgoals) and
by testing these models against incoming input by performing actions (‘active inference’). In other words,
organisms act to maximize sensory evidence for their own predictions: they are ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’.
Although originally formulated within the context of human brain function, the active inference principle
has been generalized to involve living systems across multiple spatiotemporal scale levels of organization,
including microbes and social systems [160]. According to the free energy principle, organisms ‘are’ embodied
(Bayesian) models of the world and natural selection is nature’s way of performing Bayesian model selection
[82].
4 Organisms: bowtienetworkstructures that functionashierarchicalBayesian
control systems
4.1 Input, throughput and output
Intuitively, it is easy to see how a nested modular (hierarchical) bow tie network structure may
help organisms to function as hierarchical Bayesian control systems. Organisms must learn to
connect input patterns to output patterns in ways that are compatible with life, e.g. when the input
is ‘food’ (glucose), a suitable output would be ‘approach’. When the input is ‘predator’ (smell), a
suitable response would be ‘avoid’. Such non-random responses are called ‘adaptive’, since they
allow organisms to adapt to changing environmental conditions and survive [75]. Any failure to
connect stimuli with adaptive responses during the course of their lives (ontogenetic learning)
will cause the organism to be eliminated through natural selection (phylogenetic learning). Input–
output connections are made by throughput parts, which compare actual input to a predictive
model in order to produce an adaptive response. Connecting a suitable output to a particular set
of input signals can be a daunting task for any organism, however. Most organisms live in a rich
context of environmental circumstances, which contains multiple cues that may elicit conflicting
responses (e.g. approaching food, but avoiding a predator). Such conflicts must be resolved in
order to survive (i.e. responses must be prioritized and put in sequence). This requires organisms
to build an integrated rather than segregated representation of their environments (e.g. i (food
| predator), instead of i (food), i (predator)). Because of their peculiar structure, nested modular
network structures are optimally suited to produce such integrated representations [83]. The
input parts of these structures involve multiple inputs that converge onto fewer hub structures
(Figure 5). Like spiders in a web, such input hubs keep in touch with the states of large numbers
of functionally segregated nodes and clusters in the network, each of which confers part of the
relevant information concerning the inner and outer environment. The state of such hubs thus
provides a summary representation of the states of all nodes that connect to it, i.e. a state with a
higher level of parsimony and abstraction than its subordinate substates (e.g. i (food|predator)).
Such functional integration goes on until the top of the nested hierarchy of network clusters has
been reached. At each level of integration within the input hierarchy, input states are compared
to goal states at a similar level of integration and abstraction (e.g. t (food|predator)), as well as a
higher level (e.g. t ′(food|predator|hungry)) aer which the ensuing predictions are disseminated
by divergent connections across a number of output hubs to produce an adaptive response. These
output hubs in turn impose their integrative states onto a larger number of subordinate output
hubs and so on, enabling output sequences (see section 1). Thus, functional integration within the
nested modular network structures is an important ingredient for hierarchical perception (input),
goal setting (throughput) and action control (output).
Although functional integration in nested modular network structures is a necessary precondi-
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tion, it is not suicient for hierarchical Bayesian inference. The wiring pattern of Figure 4 therefore
requires modification to allow for predictive coding. To this end, tentative hypotheses have been
put forward that are based on hierarchical message passing in the human brain [1, 59, 61, 64, 93].
Here, predictive states are encoded by nodes at a higher level of integration, which suppress predic-
tion errors at lower levels of integration by means of divergent (disynaptic) inhibitory connections
(Figure 6). The dierence (prediction error) is conveyed horizontally to the output hierarchy as
well as projected back upward by convergent excitatory connections to correct these higher-level
predictions (update the models), turning them into updated ‘beliefs’ (‘empirical priors’). Thus,
higher level models attempt to suppress (‘explain away’) prediction errors produced by lower-level
systems, whereas lower-level systems in turn try to correct higher-level predictions. Such circularly
causal relationships produce oscillations that are typically observed in neural dynamics. The out-
put hierarchy shows a similar but invertedmakeup [1, 61]. Here, prediction errors descend down
the hierarchy while diverging onto lower-level hub nodes to correct low-level predictive models,
whereas predictions ascend up the hierarchy while converging onto higher-level prediction error
units. Thus, prediction errors globally ascend and converge within the input hierarchy and descend
and diverge within the output hierarchy, to eventually supply the setpoints of lower-level output
primitives (e.g. motor or autonomous reflex arcs). Incidentally, this means that output signals
involve predictions rather than ‘commands’ [1]. Thus, each level within the input hierarchy tries to
explain awayprediction errors producedat lower levelswithin thehierarchybymeansof (predictive)
connections (Figure 6. If prediction errors cannot be suppressed by a simple (less integrated) world
model and corresponding output produced at the bottom of the hierarchy, they are carried up to
the next level in an attempt to suppress the errors using a more elaborate (contextually integrated)
model (see section 4.3). In action control, this process of hierarchical message passing takes place
in inverted order. Here, prediction errors that have not been successfully explained away run down
the hierarchy to inspire action. Such output may still reduce prediction errors within the input
hierarchy by changing the environment and, hence, the input to the system (‘active inference’). It is
thought that similar principles of hierarchical inference apply in any organism, frommicrobe to
man [58, 59, 82, 160]. For instance, membrane receptors and second messenger pathways may
represent posterior expectations that are informed by genetic or biochemical priors (setpoints) at
dierent levels to produce output. Such systemsmay produce oscillatory dynamics similar to those
observed in neural dynamics [58]. In Figure 6, we show the putative wiring scheme for hierarchical
predictive coding in biological systems [1, 59, 93], which has been adapted to accommodate an
information bottleneck (‘bow tie’ or ‘hour glass’) structure. As can be seen in this figure, bottleneck
motifs can be observed at every scale level of organization (i.e. it is a scale invariant feature): as-
cending and convergent input, descending and divergent output, as well as bottleneck ‘throughput’
structures (predictive or prediction error units) can be observed at the level of individual nodes,
clusters and the network structure at large. Indeed, the organism itself can bemodeled as one giant
feedforward loop (FFL, Box 1), which produces predictive output that feeds back into the organism
through the environment (‘active inference’, Box 2, Figure 6B).
At this point, it is important to emphasize the dierence between traditional notions of hier-
archical inference in statistics and hierarchical inference as it takes place in living systems. First,
statistical models usually involve a single hierarchy of generative models. In living systems, the
hierarchical architecture of generativemodels acquires two streams: a sensory or input stream that
is primarily concerned with inferring “what the world is doing” and an executive or output stream
that infers "what the organism is doing" (either in terms of motor behavior or autonomic function):
the inverted hierarchy in Figure 6. Within input hierarchies, increasingly comprehensive percep-
tual models are produced that try to explain lower-level sensory events (hierarchical perceptual
inference) [63]. Within output hierarchies, hierarchical inference corresponds to organisms making
increasingly complex predictions with respect to the causes of sensory events in motor (e.g. pro-
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Figure 6. Putative wiring scheme that supports hierarchical Bayesian inference in nestedmodular network
structures with information bottleneck (bow tie) organization. Adapted from Adams, Shipp, and Friston
[1], Friston [59], and Kanai et al. [93]. Subfigure (a): Excerpt of Figure 5, showing only a single input and
output hierarchy for visualization purposes. Each additional level within the nested hierarchy represents
an extended generative model at a higher level of integration. (Modules of) black nodes encode predictive
states (setpoints, updated predictions, goal states). (Modules of) red nodes encode prediction errors. Blue
connections: inhibitory predictions. Red connections: excitatory prediction errors. Connections that give rise
to the nested hierarchy of network clusters have been largely omitted (gray connections) for visualization
purposes. Input hierarchy: predictive hub nodes suppress (explain away) prediction errors produced at lower
levels within the hierarchy through descending and divergent (inhibitory) predictions, reflecting top-down
control (e.g. by FFL motifs). The dierence (prediction error) is relayed back to higher level predictive nodes
through convergent and excitatory connections, reflecting the bottom-up correction of higher level predictions
(adjustment of the model, e.g. by feedback motifs). This produces between-level circularly causal dynamics
(oscillations). Prediction error and predictive nodes or clusters also engage in circularly causal relationships
within the same level of organization, producingwithin-level oscillations (red and blue arrows, circular shapes).
Message passing of the input hierarchy is inverted in the output hierarchy. Here, top-down prediction errors
that were not successfully explained awaywork their way down to the low-level (predictive) setpoints of action
primitives to produce a concerted response, making output theory-driven and predictive rather than reactive
[1]. Note that hub nodes of prediction error clusters at some level within the input hierarchy act as predictive
nodes (empirical priors) at the next level of organization, whereas hub nodes of predictive clusters within the
output hierarchy act as prediction error units. Input and output hierarchies are connected though horizontal
connections at dierent levels within the nested hierarchy. This creates longer and shorter loops that run from
input via throughput to output, reflecting dierent degrees of information processing (see text). No horizontal
connections exist between the input and output hierarchies at the lowest level of organization, which is
an empirical finding [59, 93]. Subfigure (b): More abstract wiring diagram based on connections shown in
subfigure (a), with one more level added when compared to subfigure (a), adapted from Kanai et al. [93]. The
nested bottleneck (bow tie) structure is reflected by the copy number of nodes (or clusters), which decreases
when ascending in the hierarchy. Note that horizontal cross-connections (gray) allow energy to travel across
loops of dierent lengths. Short stimulus-response loops corresponds to simple (andmore complex) reflexes
and instinctual responses, whereas progressively longer loops enable habitual, instrumental and goal-directed
behavior. See text for further details. C : context, S : sensor, e.g. light receptors, E : eector, e.g. striatedmuscle
fiber or mucosal cell, s(t ): stimulus, e.g. visual input. r (t ): (motor or autonomous) response, e.g. striated
muscle action or mucus secretion.
prioceptive) or endocrine (e.g. enteroceptive) areas, which pose as complex behavioral strategies
(hierarchical action control) [1]. Such strategies may eventually reduce prediction error within the
input hierarchy by changing the environment and, subsequently, the input to the system (‘active
inference’). This dual aspect of hierarchical inference is emphasized by referring to hierarchical
nested bow tie network architectures (with small world characteristics). This means that "bow
tie" should be read as a dual-aspect hierarchy responsible for making inferences about hidden
states of the world and action upon those states, respectively. Second, models of hierarchical
(Bayesian) inference in statistics are unfamiliar with the concept of goal-directedness (agency).
This concept is still a topic of debate [215], yet seems to be clearly definable from the perspective
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of organisms as hierarchical control systems. As observed in section 1, perceptual control theory
already equated the reference signal (setpoint) of control systems with goal-directedness and the
hierarchical organization of reference signals with the formation of more complex goal states [157].
Similarly, model-based control theory involves organisms constructing elaborate hierarchical mod-
els of the world that serve as predictive goal-states that are encoded by intermediate throughput
areas [185]. In active inference theory, goal states align with so called empirical priors. These are
nodes or clusters that encode prior beliefs that have been updated by sensory input, i.e. priors at
intermediate levels within a hierarchical model (the black nodes and clusters in Figure 6). Such
nodes or clusters encode the states (or sensory information sampled) that the organism a priori
prefers to occupy (or sample), aer having been updated by a certain input. As a result, goal states
can be construed as posterior expectations and beliefs about controllable but hidden states of the
world. Instead of being fixed and given, such goal states are progressively constructed within the
narrowing bottlenecks of bow tie structures, which lie in between input and output hierarchies.
Thus, living systems acquire intermediate throughput streams that try to infer “what the organism
needs to be doing”. Such streams encode a nested hierarchy of goal states [155], which allows
organisms to reach a general goal through a series of subgoals and corresponding output strategies.
Thus, we necessarily introduce the notion of hierarchical Bayesian control systems. Such systems
combine hierarchical perceptual inference (input) with hierarchical goal inference (throughput)
and hierarchical action control (output).
In hierarchical inference, organisms need to decide whether signals come from a common
cause and should be integrated, or whether they come from independent sources and should be
segregated [164]. The number of independent clusters in a nested modular hierarchy is therefore a
function of the number of independent contextual cues that are relevant to the organism. When
their environments growmore complex, organisms need to expand their hierarchical trees in order
to encode more articulated models [49]. For instance, some organism can be confronted with
food (A), a mate (B), a rival (C) and a predator (D), all at the same time. It then has to choose
whether to eat (1), mate (2), fight (3) or hide (4), given its own internal state hungry (a), alone (b),
wounded (c), or weak (d). More complex environments therefore require organisms to increase
the number of network clusters within input areas to allow for percepts with higher granularity
(‘functional segregation’ or ‘factorization’, i.e. A, B, C, D, a, b, c, d). The functional integration of
such clusters into a hierarchy of part-whole relationships allows for deeper forms of perceptual
inference, producing more complex percepts (e.g. A|B|C|D|a|b|c|d). Similarly, adding clusters to the
output parts allows for a richer repertoire of actions (1, 2, 3, 4) and a deeper integration across these
output clusters allows for more elaborate forms of action control and behavior (e.g. ‘courtship’,
whichmay involve complex action sequences of e.g. 3|1|4|2, et cetera). However, having a richer
repertoire of actions raises chances that output options will conflict with one another, given a
certain input. In living systems, such conflicts are resolved in a hierarchical fashion within the
throughput parts of their networks (e.g. t(A|a)→ 1, t(A|B|b)→ 2, t(A|B|C|a|b)→ 3, t(A|B|C|D|a|b|c|d)→ 4).
More complex environments therefore require organisms to expand their goal hierarchies in order to
connect input patterns to suitable output patterns for all possible combinations of events (i.e. policy
selection). This produces extensive hierarchies of goal states, or ‘deep goal hierarchies’ [155, 154],
which consists of progressively longer loops that run from input to output via dierent levels of
integrationwithin the goal hierarchy (Figure 6). During the course of their lives, organisms construct
their goal hierarchies (world models) through a process of associative learning, which involves the
selective strengthening andweakening of connections within these throughput loops. The rewiring
of dierent parts of the goal hierarchy have been linked to dierent forms of associative learning
[155, 154]: short stimulus-response loops represent simple autonomous and/or motor arc reflexes
that allow for basic Pavlovian (stimulus–stimulus) learning and instinctive behavior, respectively.
Longer loops allow for more complex forms of behavior such as habit learning and instrumental
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learning, whereas the longest loops involve the formation of explicit world models that inspire full
goal-directed behavior. These various forms of associative learning are thought to be universal
to organisms at any scale level, with increasingly more integrated forms of goal-directed learning
occurring within increasingly ‘higher’ organisms. Pavlovian learning has been observed to occur
within bacteria [31], whereas goal-directed learning is observed within higher vertebrates and some
invertebrates [153]. Below, we will examine which types of world models are produced within deep
goal hierarchies and discuss their putative positions within a nested hierarchy of network clusters.
4.2 A taxonomy of goal states
The central tenet of hierarchical Bayesian inference in biological networks is that organisms aim to
infer the hidden causes of their sensory input (eects) and construct predictive models to do so.
The dierence (error) between these predictions and the perceived events is used simultaneously to
informbehavior (output) and toadjust themodel [58]. Frombothobservational data and theoretical
considerations, organisms are thought to construct at least two global types of predictive world
models (goal states) at the top of a goal hierarchy. One of these involves a model of the organism
itself [109, 138]. Since any organism has a body, it will consistently receive input that can be
explained as produced by or originating from within that body. Such signals may involve both
changes in the internal state of the organism (e.g. changes in internal glucose or acidity levels)
as well as changes in its external environment as a result of actions produced by the organism
itself (e.g. chemicals secreted or vibrations produced by the organism itself). Through hierarchical
Bayesian modeling, organisms will eventually infer the hidden common causes behind these
various types of signals (eects) and, eventually, the ‘self’ as a single common cause. Prediction
errors relative to such ‘self-models’ produce behavior that shows hints of a sense of agency (e.g. a
dierential response to signals produced by the organism itself rather than its environment). The
principle of hierarchical Bayesian inference therefore predicts that self-models are produced to
varying degrees in any organism, frommicrobe to man. Similarly, organisms can infer the (hidden)
common causes of eects (input) produced by factors outside of their own body [11, 109, 149].
Apart from abiotic factors such as rain or snow, such external factors may involve models of other
organisms and their intentions (e.g. predator, prey, friend or rival). Such socialmodels are produced
tovaryingdegrees inanyorganism. Predictionerrors relative to thesemodels inspire social behavior,
which reflects some sense or knowledge of the agency of other organisms, i.e. their existence, social
roles, needs and intentions.
As observed in section 4.1, the complexity of a regulatory hierarchy may vary across individuals
and species depending on environmental complexity, and the behavior of their owners varies along
with it. We therefore predict that organisms that display a greater degree of agency should show a
local extension of their nested hierarchical trees to encodemore explicit self models, i.e. involve the
integration across a larger number of network communities. This hypothesis can be tested e.g. by
examining organisms that dier in the degree to which they respond dierentially to (chemical or
physical) signals producedby themselves rather than their environment, or thedegree towhich they
show signs of (self-referential and goal-directed) behavior (agency). Such organisms should have
larger scores onmeasures of functional integration versus segregation of network communities
within specific parts of their networks (see Discussion). Similarly, we propose that social behavior,
when compared to solitary behavior, should involve some local extension of their hierarchical trees
to encode more explicit social models. Such models may become especially intricate in highly
sociable species that spend a lot of time gauging the social roles and intentions of their community
members (e.g. somebirds,mammals andprimates). Such organisms are constructingworldmodels
of the world models of other organisms (i.e. recursion and reciprocity; [62]. These hypotheses can
be tested by comparing the hierarchical network structure of solitary and social species, or social
species that dier in their level of sociability (see Discussion).
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The same goes for the integration of contextual cues across time. Predictive goal states may
involve the current state of the organism and/or its environment but also its future input states.
For instance, my current input state i t ′(A|B|C) (= being warm, well fed, no predators) seems to
matchmy current goal state t t ′((A|B|C) and output pattern ot ′(lying down), but this policymaywell
conflict with my future input state (predictive model) t ′′t+1(D|E|F) (e.g. being cold, hungry, lurking
predators), and corresponding output o ′′t+1 (heating, eating, locomotion; [100]). To resolve such
temporal conflicts, the same principle of hierarchical control that allows organisms to integrate
increasing numbers of contextual cues in (interpersonal) space can be used to integrate contextual
cues across time: temporally more distant goal states can bemodeled by control systems that are
superposed onto those that predict temporally more proximal ones in a hierarchy of part-whole
relationships [155]. This can be seen as a further extension of the hierarchies of interior (self)models
and exterior (social) models to accommodate long-term predictions with respect to self and others.
Prediction errors that are produced relative to such higher level goal states may result in actions at
a time when such events have not yet taken place. Such anticipatory actions may be aimed at a
future version of the individual itself or some other agent (e.g. ospring), rather than the current
self or the current other (e.g. foraging, stacking fat, storing food, finding shelter, building nests,
feeding ospring, preparing to attack). This involves a time and energy investment that is not
immediately contingent to the current situation. Thus, we predict that temporally more distant
goal states require more extensive hierarchies of control, i.e. the integration across a larger number
of network communities. This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the hierarchical network
(bow tie) structure of individuals or species that dier in their ability to anticipate events.
In hierarchical Bayesian inference, each superordinate level performs a form of ‘pattern recog-
nition’ on events that take place at subordinate levels. The superordinate level thus encodes a
more generalized and parsimonious (abstract) representation of events that happen below it. Such
higher-level generative models go well beyond the lower-level data that helped to spark their exis-
tence: theymay involve quite creative designs thatmay autonomously informbehavior [202]. When
this principle is applied systematically to goal states, something interesting happens. Asmentioned,
organisms produce a hierarchy of goal states that eventually involves a global division between
internal (self-referential) and external (social) goal states, both of which can be set proximally or
more distally in time. Logically then, the hierarchical integration across goal states can be pushed
one level further, involving an additional level of inference across these two global goal states. This
produces an overarching third series of goal states that are common to both the organism itself
and its (social) environment, across timescales (Figure 7).
Suchmodels transcend the level of the individual organism, its immediate (social) environment,
as well as the immediate moment. In other words, such goal states define (social) laws, rules or
standards that hold across dierent individuals, social groups and timescales [39, 204]. Thus,
hierarchical Bayesian inference predicts that, eventually, goal states are produced that (according
to the organism) have a general validity for everyone across (infinite) time. Prediction errors that
are produced relative to such ‘normative’ goal states may involve a time and energy investment
that is not immediately contingent to the interests of the organism itself. Rather, such behavior
is aimed at striking a balance between the short-term and long-term interests of individuals and
social groups, i.e. to promote global rather than local stability. Individuals that follow such goals
will at times make decisions that favor the (long-term) interests of others rather than themselves,
i.e. they will show altruistic behavior. Conversely, such goals may cause somemembers of a group
to punish themselves or others for social norm violation [51]. Altruistic and law-abiding forms of
behavior have been observed in a variety of (higher) organisms [20]. We expect such goal states to
represent the highest level of hierarchical Bayesian inference and, therefore, the highest level of
integration within a nested hierarchy of network clusters. In other words, they truly represent our
’highest goals’. In the active inference literature, such goals are prior beliefs that rest upon each
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Figure 7. Schematic view of the way in which higher level (‘normative’) world models may develop within a
hierarchy of goal states through the functional integration across self and social models. For visualization
purposes, no dierentiation is made between predictive and prediction error nodes or clusters (for details on
this, see Figure 6). Individual nodes in this figure may represent both single nodes and clusters, conforming to
the scale invariant principle.
organism’s place in a particular eco-niche (with varying degrees of pro-sociality). This leads to the
notion of variational eco-niche construction, whereby each individual builds its own generative
models that can be shared among other members of its family or conspecifics [38, 211]. In humans,
the exchange of such insights may aid in an attempt to eventually construct a globally held world
view. Thus, normative goals give rise to our scientific, moral and judicial institutions.
This prediction can be tested by examining organisms that dier in the degree to which they en-
gage in activities that are aimed at promoting global and long-term rather than local and short-term
stability of individuals and groups (e.g. mediation versus polarization, fairness versus unfairness in
the sharing of energy and resources, punishment for social norm violation versus laxity, altruistic
versus selfish behavior, transpersonal identification versus nepotism, et cetera). Combinations of
such activities are typically (but not exclusively) found in so called ‘higher organisms’, and should
link to measures of nested hierarchical trees in biological networks (see Discussion). Incidentally,
hierarchical Bayesian inference may explain why higher organisms tend to have bigger throughput
areas (e.g. the giant nucleus of eukaryotic versus prokaryotic cells, or the frontal and anterior
extensions of the brains of higher primates). Such extensions may be required to accommodate
more encompassing world models. Despite such extensions, however, the basic principles that
govern behavior in higher organisms appear to be the same as in woodlice: action sequences are
produced that aim to minimize prediction error relative to world models with dierent degrees of
contextual comprehensiveness [24, 58].
4.3 Stress in hierarchical Bayesian control systems
The hierarchical control systems perspective on living organisms allows for a clear definition of
‘stress’ [152]. Stress can be defined as the overall level of prediction error, namely, the dierences
between empirical priors and posterior expectations. In predictive coding formulations (of hierar-
chical Bayesian control) the overall amplitude of prediction errors is oen quantified in terms of
precision. This leads to the notion of precision at dierent levels of the hierarchy, whose balance
is crucial for determining the relative influence of top-down prior beliefs relative to bottom-up
sensory evidence. This will become important below, when we think about stress as reducing prior
precision and rendering the organism more exposed to belief updating based upon immediate
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sensory information. Prediction errors produce an output sequence or stress response to reduce the
error. In hierarchical Bayesian control systems, lower level policies (e.g. walking) are allowed to run
freely until prediction errors are produced within the input hierarchy (e.g. stumbling across some
unforeseen object; [171]. If error signals cannot be suiciently countered by a simple, straightfor-
ward response generated at the same level of the hierarchy (e.g. side-stepping), prediction error is
‘escalated upward’ to higher level control systems that involve more comprehensive world models
and corresponding policies (e.g. walking around the object; [100]. Thus, prediction errors pass a
hierarchical succession of goal states (increasingly integrated world models) in an attempt to solve
the problem. This corresponds to the application of increasingly complex generative models and
corresponding behavioral strategies to suppress prediction errors. Althoughmore elaborate, such
strategies may eventually suppress prediction errors in ways that simpler loops cannot (e.g. by
reaching the top of a fruit tree, or climbing a social hierarchy).
Since any hierarchy of control systems is finite, prediction error signals (variational free energy)
may accumulate upwards across multiple levels of control until the top of the hierarchy is reached.
At that point, the organism has exhausted its hierarchy of goal states and corresponding policies
(i.e. even complex behavioral strategies are ineective at suppressing prediction errors). This
accumulation of prediction error can be thought of in terms of a loss of control over free energy
(increased uncertainty, or decreased precision). In the Bayesian inference literature, rising levels
of free energy are usually accompanied by increases in computational complexity (i.e. a loss of
the ability to compress, see above). This is universally accompanied by a loss of metabolic or
thermodynamic eiciency. Thus, the accumulation of prediction error within the higher levels of
the hierarchy corresponds to increased energy demand. Indeed, scholars have linked the amount
of regulatory activity of organisms to the expenditure of energy and resources [69, 125]. Short
loops in a nested hierarchy produce relatively simple (reflexive, instinctive, or habitual) behavior
across smaller timescales that require small amounts of regulatory work and energy expenditure
(automatic processing, e.g. walking). Longer loops produce more complex (instrumental and
goal-directed) behavior across larger timescales that involves more regulatory work and demands
more energy (eortful processing, e.g. climbing). Since high-level (eortful) strategies demand
more energy, the fruitless pursuit of such strategies may at some point cause energy demand
to exceed energy supply. In such cases (allostatic overload; [125]), organisms are known to fall
back from higher level to lower forms of behavior to save energy and resources [69, 174]. When
energy shortage is particularly severe, organisms revert to a universal stress response, called the
emergency (life history stage) response in higher organisms or the stringent response in microbes
[43, 220]. Such responses are highly conserved across species, e.g. with E. coli bacteria shutting
downmany contextually redundant regulatory genetic pathways when starved under low-glucose
conditions [48], B. subtilis entering a spore stage [128] and vertebrates entering some form of
energy conservation or hibernation under unfavorable conditions [168]. Emergency responses
universally involve a down-regulation of metabolism, reducedmotility, reduced sociability, a halt
on reproductive activity and/or a tendency to neglect (or even eat) ospring [78, 219]). Overall,
they economize on long-term, reproductive and/or altruistic activities in favor of short-term, self-
repairing and self-preserving activities. In other words, organisms appear to abandon contextually
more integrated (social, normative) goal states in favor of simpler (self-referential) goals. We
therefore propose that allostatic overload interferes with the ability of organisms to maintain
highly integrated and energy-demanding goal states under severe levels of stress, forcing them to
‘downgrade’ to less integrated goal states that require less regulatory work. The universal presence
of this principle suggests it has cornerstone value in securing survival ‘when the going gets tough’.
For amechanistic account on how thismight work, it is worthwhile to examine the biophysics of
emergency responses inmulticellular organisms or stringent responses in bacteria. Such responses
are mounted in a similar way across species, regardless of the stressor the organism encounters
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(e.g. starvation, drought, heat, cold, acidity, salinity, DNA damage, social stress) [140, 113, 112, 120,
142, 195], or even whether the response is genetic or neuronal in nature [80, 112, 124, 175, 174, 209].
In all cases, vertically accumulated prediction error (free energy) is sensed by a small number of
hub structures located near the top of the hierarchy. These hubs represent the highest level of
integration across subordinate network clusters (Figure 5, 6, 7) and subsequently have the highest
degree or number of connections per node in the network. From simulation studies in statistical
physics, it is known that the highest degree nodes in a network have the highest levels of energy
dissipation, corresponding tohighest energydemand. Whenenergydemandexceeds energy supply,
these hub structures simply shut down [73]. This process may be facilitated by glucocorticoids
or analog signaling substances that actively degrade the connections that encode higher-order
predictive models, as part of the revision of maladaptive models and corresponding policies [152].
Thus, when consistently flooded by ascending prediction error signals, high-order hub structures
will drop out of the network. Since these hubsmaintainmany long-distance connections with other
network clusters and subclusters, their shutdown causes the network to fall apart (Figure 8). This
causes a shi in the balance between functional integration and segregation of network clusters in
favor of functional segregation [205], corresponding to a collapse of the nested modular hierarchy:
more encompassing goal states eectively ‘decompose’ into their constituent (sub)components,
inducing a corresponding change in behavior. We predict that this collapse is a function of node
degree: themost integrative goal states are the first to go, but subordinate levels with lesser-degree
hubs may follow depending on the amount of accumulated stress (prediction error). Severe stress
may therefore cause a gradeddisintegration of a nested hierarchy of goal states across several levels.
Like military command collapsing in a top-down fashion (generals first, then colonels, lieutenants,
higher oicers, et cetera), allostatic overloadmay dissolve a hierarchy of part–whole relationships,
leaving only the local troops and the odd sergeant major to take care of the problem (Figure 8. This
hypothesis can be tested by examining measures of hierarchical complexity of network structures
at dierent levels of stress (ascending prediction error, see Discussion).
As discussed, high-level nodes and clusters integrate information across a large number of
subordinate models (functional integration). When such hub structures shut down, the individual
network clusters that constitutehigher level generativemodelswill no longerbe connectedand start
to operate on their own (functional segregation). In other words, the top of the regulatory pyramid
is lost (gray nodes in Figure 8). This corresponds to a loss of high-level goal states (precise empirical
priors) that try to explain away prediction errors, producing a persistent failure tomodel and predict
high-level structure in the sensorium (higher levels can no longer provide precise or confident
constraints on lower levels of inference). From a physiological point of view, this would look like
a loss of anticipatory long-term goal-directed behavior (allostasis) and a reversion to short-term
homeostasis. Thus, stress causes organisms to take lesser amounts of contextual information into
accountwhen formulating a response. Such decontextualization has several short-term advantages.
First, less energy and resources are spent on processing stimuli, allowing organisms to endure
unfavorable conditions for longer periods of time. Second, the bypassing of higher-level control
systems reduces the path length of the network, allowing signals to travel from input to output
structures across shorter distances, producing faster responses. Finally, the top-down collapse of
high level integrative control amounts to a loss of top-down inhibitory (predictive) connections
that constrain lower-level systems. This allows lower-level systems to be expressedmore freely,
making themmore pronounced and easier to trigger, or what is referred to as disinhibition in the
psychological sciences [71]. This heightening of the senses (within the input hierarchy) and livening
of responses (within the output hierarchy) may provide organisms with just the edge needed to
suppress prediction errors, by forcing themselves a way out of a dire situation.
Such changes comeat aprice, however, which is a loss of regulatory finesse. A decrease of higher
level integrative controlmakes organismsmore vulnerable to environmental conditions that require
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Figure 8. Hierarchical Bayesian control systems allow organisms to incorporate an increasing number of
contextual cues from their environment and create a hierarchy of world models or goal states that are used
to inform behavior. At the highest levels of integration, these involve internal (self) models, external (social)
models and cross-cutting (normative) models (Figure 7). In severely stressed organisms, the hierarchy of goal
states collapses in a top-downmanner to save energy and resources. This amounts to a pruning of the nested
modular (hierarchical) tree (panel A). We propose that this high-level shut-down involves a shi in the balance
between functional integration and segregation of network clusters in biological networks in favor of functional
segregation. This process causes a graded decomposition of high-level integrative goal states that are not
immediately relevant to the current situation (gray nodes in this figure). This results in a ‘decontextualization’ of
behavior, causing organisms to favor short-term and self-centered actions (informed by self models) over long-
term social and/or normative behavior (social and normative models). The regulatory collapse may involve
several hierarchical levels of integration, depending on the error levels that are encountered. Hence, rising
levels of prediction error (stress)will cause energy to flow from input to output via increasingly short processing
loops (blue arrow in panel B). Phenotypically, these changes manifest as organisms ‘downgrading’ from goal-
directed to instrumental, habitual or even reflexive forms of behavior. The top-down loss of integrative control
produces a disinhibition of lower levels, increasing the risk of critical slowing down. Note that individual
dierences may cause some organisms to retain top-down control under severe levels of stress. See text for
further details.
a broader (and/or long-term) perspective. Additionally, a deep collapse of a regulatory hierarchy
may lead to a situation where input almost immediately produces output and vice versa. In such a
case, even a small environmental disturbance may trigger an intense, volatile, and uncoordinated
response from which it may recover only slowly. In other words, a deep collapse increases the
reactivity of a system, making it more strongly coupled to its environment. When the loss of
control is particularly severe, the system reaches a state in which the connectivity between the
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dierent elements of the system becomes so strong that only little energy is needed to trigger a
massive, synchronized response: a sudden phase transition, or tipping point. This state is known as
‘critical slowing down’ (CSD; [10]). CSD is a highly generic state of network systems that are poised
on the brink of a tipping point. The dynamics of such systems is characterized by high levels of
variance, increased anticorrelation between dierent elements of the system and slow recovery
from perturbation [107]. Although CSD is well-known phenomenon in abiotic systems, it has only
recently been demonstrated in living systems, (e.g. [212], including human mood fluctuations
[107]). In control systems, CSD corresponds to a state of intrinsic hyperconnectivity between the
input, throughput and output parts of the system, to such a degree that it increases its extrinsic
connectivity (i.e. the system with its environment). At some point, the system may become so
strongly coupled to its environment that it will lose its ability to compensate for environmental
disturbances. It will decompensate (lose control), aer which the interior of the system will linearly
follow that of the environment. This corresponds to a loss of homeostasis, which amounts either to
disease or the death of the organism.
To our knowledge, this is first time that a (graded) collapse of higher level control under stress
is considered as the primary factor that triggers hyperconnectivity (CSD) and tipping points in
living systems. These states may develop when such a collapse reaches too deeply down a hi-
erarchy of control systems (i.e. when the hierarchical tree is pruned beyond a level of adequate
control). According to this model, organisms may dier in their susceptibility to criticality and
tipping points as a result of individual dierences in the development and maturation of their
regulatory hierarchies: dierent heights of the regulatory tree produce dierent sensitivities to
CSD and tipping points (decompensation). Such dierences may become particularly manifest
when poorly developed hierarchical trees are pruned under stressful conditions beyond a level of
adequate control. This hypothesismay be tested e.g. by examining the degree towhichmeasures of
hierarchical complexity predict the threshold at which dierent organisms (e.g. microbes) collapse
under extreme conditions (see Discussion [142]).
Some scholars define stress specifically as a failure of control [44], which would situate that
state somewhere in between criticality and tipping points as defined above. Others focus more on
physiological states [125] or cognitive processes [102, 207]. Here, we employ amore liberal definition
of stress as the (cumulative) error state of hierarchical control systems [152]. The advantage of
this definition is that it lies on a continuum, with clear and objectifiable stress-responses marking
discrete levels of stress, i.e. (0) Routine performance (low-level action-perception cycles, reflexive,
instinctive or habitual behavior, ‘eortless control’), (1) Creative problemsolving (upward escalation
of prediction error signals, instrumental or goal-directed action, ‘eortful control’), (2) Emergency
responses (shut down of hub structures, decomposition of non-vital goal states, downgrading from
higher to lower forms of associative learning), (3) Critical slowing down (hyperconnectivity) and (4)
Tipping points (decompensation). For a similar categorization of the stress response, see [166].
4.4 Example: the human brain as a scale-invariant, hierarchical Bayesian control sys-
tem
So far, wehavediscussed rules of network structure and function thatmayapply to all living systems.
Wewill now show that such rules apply to human behavior. At larger spatial scales, the human brain
has a multimodular, hierarchically controlled small world network structure [30, 84]. Its 86 billion
neurons [8] form neural modules that are an average of around 5 degrees of separation apart from
any othermodule in the brain [18, 85, 191, 84]. Thesemodules form a nested hierarchy of part-whole
relationships [132, 133] that give rise to a bow tie network architecture [119]. Overt behavior reflects
the concerted action of large numbers of simple I/O patterns (motor and endocrine primitives)
at the bottom of this hierarchy, the activity of which is carefully orchestrated by higher levels of
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integration (Figure 8 [24, 22, 54, 55, 162]). The human brain has been compared to a Bayesian
inference engine, whose primary job it is to infer the (hidden) causes of its sensory input by building
predictive models of the world [60, 63]. In doing so, a hierarchy of generativemodels is constructed
from basic perceptive input (Figure 9).
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Figure9. Subfigure (a): Thehumanmind canbemodeled as a nestedmodular hierarchy of generativemodels
that control perception and action [9]. The statistical structure of this hierarchy is assumed to mirror that of
the humanmental phenotype (i.e. inner experience and overt behavior). Circles indicate generative models
and circles within circles submodels. Higher level (domain-general) models are inferred from progressively
lower level (domain-specific) models down to the level of perceptive information. Only the (global) flow of
prediction errors (red arrows) is shown in this figure (predictions run in the opposite direction, see Figure 6
and 8). Arrows sizes reflect the putative contribution of a particular domain in biasing inference within another
domain (see text). Vertical position indicates level of inference. Cognition, emotion, executive functions
andmotivation occupy a similar level. Within the output hierarchy, higher level generative models impose
predictions onto lower level models (blue arrows) to eventually control overt behavior. Domains may aect
each other across loops of dierent path lengths (e.g. from input to output via a hierarchically ordered set of
goal states), reflecting dierent degrees of information processing (evaluation, policy selection). The shortest
loopswithin this hierarchy represent basic stimulus-response patterns (e.g. simple andmore complex ‘reflexes’,
instinct patterns and instrumental behavior), whereas the longest loops reflect goal-directed behavior that is
informed by highly integrated world models involving self-referential, social and normative models (Figure 6).
Each phenotypical domainmay havemultiple anatomical brain regions as a correlate (see text and references).
Subfigure (b): When stressed severely, contextually redundant higher level goal states are shut down to save
energy and to enhance the stress response (Figure 8). This corresponds to a collapse of self, social and/or
normative models, causing a shi away from goal-directed behavior (longer loops) towards instrumental,
habitual, instinctive or reflexive behavior (progressively shorter loops). The loss of higher level constraint
triggers a disinhibition of lower levels within the hierarchy, i.e. emotional, motivational and sensorimotor
(or sensori-endocrine) mental states. If this change does not force a quick reduction of prediction errors
(and corresponding stress responses), this physiological response may revert to a model of psychopathology.
Disinhibition may cause hyperconnectivity in control systems (CSD) [107], which strengthens the coupling of
an individual with the external environment. This may present as strong interpersonal dependency and/or
social conflict.
The statistical structure of this hierarchy is assumed to mirror that of the humanmental pheno-
type (i.e. inner experience and overt behavior; [9], see Figure 9). At the bottom of this hierarchy,
three global types of perceptual input can be discerned. Exteroceptive perception involves in-
formation coming from the external environment, i.e. the main senses of vision, hearing, touch,
smell and taste. Interoceptive information involves information feeds coming from the internal
environment, e.g. gut and vascular pressure and pain aerents, blood glucose concentrations,
smooth muscle tension, et cetera. Finally, proprioceptive information takes up position in between
the internal and external environment andmostly involves input from skeletal (striated) muscles,
tendons and joints. Based on this basic input, the hierarchy of generative models is progressively
produced (Figure 9). Recent studies conceptualize human emotion as hierarchical Bayesian infer-
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ence on predominantly interoceptive information, placing these generative models somewhere
along the middle of this hierarchy [176, 182]. Similarly, cognition may involve hierarchical inference
on predominantly exteroceptive information [183]. Executive functions involve part of an output
hierarchy that is engaged in high-level (conceptual and premotor) planning, with a predominant
connection to proprioceptive input (controlling muscle action) [153]. Motivational functions have
been conceptualized as aiding in predicting the precision of motor and endocrine output, perhaps
with a predominant influence on endocrine actions [155]. At the top of this hierarchy, humansmake
highly integrated models of their own inner and outer states along with its history and possible
futures (self-image). Such self-models are processed in midline areas of the human brain, which
are involved in the highest levels of integrative processing [77, 147, 127]. Additionally, humans
make highly integrated models of the inner and outer states of others and their possible histories
and futures (theory of mind). Such models involve medioprefontal areas, temporal poles, the
superior temporal sulci, and temporoparietal junction [3, 66, 121]. Like midline self-structures,
these areas process information at very high levels of contextual integration. Finally, brain areas
have been identified that support a highest level of human functioning that transcends the level of
the individual as well as its immediate social environment and connects people across nations and
timescales through common laws and values. The existence of such a domain of functioning has
been eschewed by scientists for quite some time because of its inherently moral (or even religious)
nature. Nevertheless, it is predicted by the principle of hierarchical Bayesian inference (Figure 7).
Several empirical studies have found independent components of the humanmental phenotype
that suggest the presence of normative functions, e.g. Koltko-Rivera [101], Stankov [193], and Collani
and Grumm [36]. Individual dierences in the degree to which subjects score on these phenotypical
dimensions can explain dierences in normative or moral behavior. Indeed, empirical studies have
demonstrated a taxonomy of goal states that eventually involves the superordinate goals of agency
(connecting with the self), communion (to connect with a local social group) andmeaning (connect-
ing across spatial, temporal and social barriers) [201]. These superordinate goals are closely related
to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (with multiple layers of self-actualization, social belonging and
transcendence; [101]) and have a strong resemblance to self, social and normative or nomothetic
goal states as predicted by hierarchical Bayesian inference. Indeed, a large body of literature has
identified brain regions involved in normative behavior, which include ventromedial areas for norm
processing and right insula, dorsolateral prefrontal, and dorsal cingulate cortices for processing in
relation to social norm violation [230]. Such brain areas again involve some of the highest levels of
integration across lower level systems. Overall, our brains seem to have capitalized particularly
on information processing at high levels of functional integration, making detailed predictions of
events that take place more distally in time as well as in (interpersonal) space [81]. The ability of
the human brain to take large amounts of contextual information into account when formulating a
response seems to explainmuch of its disproportionate size [47]. Despite such extensions, however,
the basic principles of control theory that govern behavior in lower organisms remain the same
as in humans. As in woodlice, activity levels drop (i.e. we become quiet and pleased) when the
perception of our past, current and future environment agrees with our intricate interpersonal
goals and expectations.
As observed (section 4.3), severe stress seems to modulate the behavior of organisms in a
universal way in that it degrades a nested hierarchy of generative models in a top-down fashion.
Put bluntly, we propose that severe stress prunes the top of a regulatory pyramid, producing
a ‘chicken without a head’ syndrome in any type of organism (a subtle form of ‘decortication’).
Althoughmild forms of stress dierentially aect the perception of ourselves and the world around
us, severe stress brings us into ‘survival mode’ [29, 117, 213, 125]. Neuroimaging studies show that
the human brain falls back from goal-directed to habitual control during stress [175, 174]. This
corresponds to decreased activity in higher level systems such as the anterior cingulate, anterial
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insular and temporopolar areas [5, 45, 124, 126, 175, 174, 209]. Brain areas that decrease activity
during severe stress are midline structures involved in generating self-models (self-image; [70, 87,
97, 192]). Additionally, severe stress decreases activity in brain areas associatedwith the production
of social world models or theory of mind [170, 203]. Finally, severe stress is known to negatively
aect moral decision making [106, 129, 194, 224]. This change in behavior is related to altered
activity in brain areas involved in transpersonal identification, including law-abiding andmoral
behavior [106]. Overall, severe stress decreases activity specifically within brain areas that support
some of the highest forms of contextual integration. Such findings support the hypothesis that
significant stress causes a top-down collapse of deep goal hierarchies, forcing energy to flow across
shorter action-perception cycles (Figure 8, 9).
As observed, we propose that a top-down collapse of hierarchical control reduces inhibitory
connections, which can lead to a state of critical slowing down (CSD). This phenomenon has been
coined as a genericmodel formental illness [107]. This idea is supported by recent findings showing
that some changes in brain function are common to a diverse range of acute mental disorders
(psychopathology, e.g.majorunipolardepression, bipolardisorders, psychosis or anxietydisorders).
These transdiagnostic changes in functional neuroanatomy include decreased activity in prefrontal
and anterior brain regions, which support high-level cognitive control [126]. Acute mental illness
can therefore be considered a temporary collapse of higher levels of control that reaches too deeply
down the hierarchy of goal states. This causes a dysregulation (disorder) of lower levels within the
hierarchy of generative models (Figure 9). These hypotheses can be tested by comparing measures
of hierarchical complexity in dierent brain areas between dierent stress levels and corresponding
behavioral measures, e.g. such changes would result in a compression of the knot of the bow tie
structure (Figure 9, see Discussion).
From the above, it follows that individual dierences in the degree to which hierarchies of
control have grown andmatured in the course of life (i.e. personality development) should explain
dierent susceptibilities to mental illness (CSD): people with strongly matured hierarchical trees
may better withstand the pruning of their hierarchies during a stressful episode than people with
lesser developed hierarchical trees. Interestingly, neuroimaging studies show that people with
(borderline) personality disorders, which aremore susceptible tomental decompensation (‘crises’),
have lowvolumesof graymatter in the sameareasof cognitive control that aredownregulatedunder
stress [28, 126]. This supports the idea that a stress-induced collapse of already underdeveloped
regulatory hierarchies triggers CSD in human subjects with personality disorders. Indeed, brain
areas that are underdeveloped in people with personality disorders involve the same areas that
harbor our world models of self, others and global world views [28]. Thus, it seems that the global
faculty of cognitive control that is downregulated in acutemental illness canbe subdivided intohigh-
level world models that support agency (self-models), communion (social models) andmeaning
(normative models), which are each downregulated to dierent degrees under stress (Figure 9B).
These mental faculties may therefore qualify as transdiagnostic factors, which are to some degree
involved in all personality disorders (when underdeveloped) and acute mental disorders (when
downregulated). Indeed, the ‘alternative model’ for personality disorders in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of mental disorders (DSM-5) currently lists self-referential and social functions
as two global transdiagnostic factors in personality disorders [229]. These may at some point be
supplemented with the third overarching factor (normative/transpersonal functions), a conclusion
that is consistent with some existingmodels of personality development (e.g. [35]). Thematuration
of these ‘great three’ world models involves a life-long process of associative learning within long
stimulus–response loops that have been linked to goal-directed behavior. The development of
these mental domains across the lifespan has been referred to as personality development, or
more specifically character formation. The various generative models that are subordinate to
these three top-level domains (i.e. emotional, motivational, cognitive and executive domains and
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subdomains) qualify as lesser-order transdiagnostic factors (Figure 9A). These involve shorter
stimulus–response loops that have been associated with habit learning and instrumental learning.
Such functions develop at earlier stages of life and their stable expression across years has been
referred to as temperament. During episodes of acute stress, this hierarchy collapses in a top-down
manner, producing adisinhibition of subordinate levels down to the level of the shortest reflex loops
(i.e. instinctive behavior, including a disinhibition of responses such as fight, flight, fright, feeding,
freezing, reproducing, fainting, fawning, et cetera). Thus, the hierarchy of generative models as
shown in Figure 9B reverts to a hierarchical taxonomy of psychopathology (acute mental illness;
[103]). The relative contribution of each phenotypical domain to the overall disease presentation
can be parsimoniously expressed as a transdiagnostic factor profile.
Apart from explaining individual dierences in (susceptibility to) mental illness, the current
model may explain individual dierences in social interaction. This is because individual organisms
can be modeled as hierarchical Bayesian control systems that respond to each other, i.e. the
output of one individual (behavior) may serve as the input to another (perception) [62]. Individual
dierences in hierarchical Bayesian control (e.g. personality) may therefore produce dierent
types of social interaction. Such individual dierences determine connectivity at a local level and
act as simple rules that knit together complex social networks at a global level. Indeed, social
networks may follow similar rules of hierarchical Bayesian inference as shown in Figure 6, i.e. some
individuals can be modeled as predictive units and others as units that correct predictions and
report on errors. In social networks, however, individuals can be expected to swap roles more
flexibly than neurons or molecules, i.e. some individuals may act as predictive agents at some
time point and as prediction error agents the next. This produces social clusters in which some
opinions and beliefs are held and contrasted with those of other social groups, while trying to get a
mutual grip on reality. As observed, low levels of top-down control may induce a state of critical
slowing down (CSD, see above) within hierarchical Bayesian control systems. This is true regardless
of whether such deficits are temporary (e.g. stress-induced) or chronic (e.g. developmental) in
nature. Since CSD represents both within-system and between-system enhanced coupling, two
undercontrolled individuals may become strongly coupled. CSD in one person may therefore
induce or sustain CSD in another individual, producing highly recursive (clonic) stimulus–response
relationships between two individuals. This would be amodel of strongmutual dependency and/or
intense social conflict, including a mutual loss of law abiding andmoral behavior in humans. Like
clonic spinal reflexes, vicious cycles in social behavior are a symptom of insuicient higher level
control, and typically require a third external party (e.g. mediation, judicial arbitry, or medical
intervention) in order to be reduced [50].
5 Discussion
We have shown that living systems can be conceptualized as hierarchical Bayesian control systems
with a nested, modular and bottleneck (bow tie) network architecture. Such systems come with
specific dynamics that appear universal across species and levels of biological organization. Within
input and output areas, nested hierarchies of network clusters allow for perceptual inference and
action control, respectively. In order to connect input patterns to adaptive output patterns (policy
selection), deep goal hierarchies are produced that incorporate increasing amounts of the inner
and outer context of the organism. Such models are continuously updated based on ascending
prediction error. Severe stress (prediction error or free energy) causes goal hierarchies to collapse
in a top-downmanner. We propose that this is due to a shut down of high-level integrative hub
structures as a result of insuicient (free) energy dissipation, tilting the balance between functional
integration and segregation within nested modular network structures towards functional segrega-
tion. A shallow collapse of a goal hierarchy causes output (behavior) to shis away from long-term
and normative towards short-term, self-centered and/or social goals. A deep collapse manifests as
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the phenomenon of critical slowing down (CSD) and the occurrence of tipping points. CSD causes a
strong coupling between an organism and its environment, equaling a loss of homeostasis. We
suggest that the above changes are universal features of living systems andmay occur at any spatial
scale level of organization. In order to test these predictions, researchers will need to consider
whole organisms and social groups and not just parts of them. This has been amajor obstacle in
the past, but modern data analysis techniques are increasingly becoming closer to studying the
full complexity of interactions between genes, proteins, metabolites, neurons, brain areas, animal
populations and people (the -omics literature). Such large datasets are now increasingly made
available at open databases (e.g. [163, 208]) and can be studied using open analysis platforms (e.g. R
or Python) to test predictions. Below, we will discuss several ways of testing these predictions.
5.1 General architecture
Our first prediction follows from the universal presence of small world topologies in living systems
(see Introduction. As a result of this universality, we expect living network systems of any type to
show commonalities in network structure. Network structure can be analyzed using soware pack-
ages such as igraph in R [41] or Cytoscape [177]. Small worldness can be quantified by calculating a
small worldness index, which compares the clustering coeicient (modularity) and average path
length of given network to a randomly connected network of equal size [88]. A value significantly
greater than 1 (and preferably more) indicates that the network is non-randomly connected and
contains hub nodes and clusters that allow energy to dissipate along short and eicient paths. Hub
nodes can be identified by examining the degree (number of connections) per node, and centrality
measures can be calculated that examine the relative importance of nodes in guiding traic across
a network. Hub structures contract their neighboring nodes into network clusters, which can be
detected quantitatively bymeans of network community detection algorithms (e.g. [143]). Soware
has been developed that allows detection of so called ‘rich club’ structures (Figure 4), which are
collections of hub nodes that connect significantly more to other hubs than chance levels [150].
Rich clubs involve nested hierarchies of hub nodes that produce a scale invariant network struc-
ture. In such structures, each network cluster can bemodeled as a node at a next level of spatial
aggregation. Rich clubs are an important infrastructure for the nested functional integration as an
important ingredient of hierarchical inference (section 3.1). Also, soware packages exist that can
test network structures for a diverse range of motifs, e.g. [122]. These include bow tie motifs as well
as their constituentmotifs, such as feedforward loops and feedback loops. At the organism level, we
expect biological networks to show a nested bow tie (bottleneck) structure, with cross-connections
between dierent levels of the nested hierarchy that allow for shortcuts, producing processing
loops of dierent path lengths. We expect bow tie motifs to consist of a family of smaller motifs
that include feedforward and feedback loops. Studies have already shown an abundance of the
feedforward loopmotif, which we expect to reflect top-down predictive processing (Box 1, section
3.2). Such motifs should be counterbalanced by feedback motifs that reflect bottom-up correction
of higher level predictions by lower level prediction errors.
With respect to energy flows across biological network structures (network ‘function’) and
its directionality, a distinction can be made between global (macrolevel) and local (microlevel)
flows. The global flow of energy across nested bow tie structures should involve multiple energy
streams converging onto higher level hub structures while ascending in a scale invariant hierarchy,
reflecting the functional integration of prediction error signals. Also, it should involve multiple
energy streams diverging while descending in such a hierarchy, reflecting top-down predictive
control. The throughput areas should involve circular patterns of flow, reflecting the continuous
cross-evaluation of incoming information and outgoing responses, i.e. policy selection (i.e. the
top-down suppression of prediction errors by high-level predictive models and the adjustment of
higher-order predictive models by ascending prediction error). This directionality may be reversed
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in output hierarchies. With respect to local flows, we expect input areas of bow tie motifs to contain
a large proportion of hub nodes with multiple arrows converging onto each hub. Such ‘integrator
hubs’ (sinks, or driver hubs; [222]) are said to have a high in-degree, referring to the number of incom-
ing connections from other nodes that indicate the process of functional integration. Conversely,
the output areas of bow tie motifs should contain a significant proportion of network motifs that
involve multiple outputs diverging from a single (hub) node onto a distributed set of other nodes.
Such ‘distributor hubs’ (sources, or driven hubs; [222]) have a large out-degree, referring to the
number of outgoing connections that support the process of action control. The throughput parts
may show a substantial number of sources, sinks, and hubs with balanced numbers of incoming
and outgoing connections, reflecting continuous cross-evaluation. The net in- and out-degree of
hubs is expected to shi along a gradient from input to throughput and output parts of the network,
reflecting a smooth transition between these domains. As observed, we expect the dynamics of
bottom-up prediction error units and top-down predictive units (as well as within-level dynamics)
to produce oscillatory behavior of dierent spatiotemporal scale, i.e. attractor states.
Predictions with respect to the directionality of links in biological networks can be tested using
soware developed to study causal relationships (conditional dependencies in time) between
mutually dependent variables (e.g. [172]). Inferring directions amongst variables using causal
reasoning soware is considered a hard problem in statistics and the directions obtained may not
always be reliable. In networks in which nodes have clear andmeasurable relationships (e.g. ge-
nomic, proteomic or neural networks), it may be quite feasible to infer directions, whereas in other
networks (e.g. statistical networks used to study brain function or phenotypical states), testing
these hypotheses may prove to be more diicult. Recent attempts to infer both global [86] and
local [139] directionalities of functional connections in the human brain have involved the use of a
novel and promising phase transfer entropy measure [111]. Interestingly, this measure may partly
reflect the flow of prediction error (free energy) across network systems, since entropy and energy
measures are related through the second law of thermodynamics. Using phase transfer entropy, a
bottom-up convergence was demonstrated in sensory areas, consistent with ascending prediction
errors within the first part of a bow tie structure. Evidence for top-down divergence was less clear,
however. At amore local level, a bidirectional convergence/divergencemotif was found, whichmay
reflect true bidirectionality or an insuicient decomposition of flow directionalities into ascending
prediction errors and descending predictions. Overall, the quantification of energy flows and their
directions within biological networks is an important venue for further study. Similarmeasures that
are used to study directionality of energy flows in brain function can be used to study molecular or
neural networks.
Several of the predictions made in this paper require a quantification of the concept of ‘hierar-
chy’. Despite its common use in everyday language, it has proven a challenge to produce a formal
definition of hierarchy, hence several definitions exist [40]. In small world networks, some nodes
or clusters only exist by virtue of other nodes or clusters, i.e. they form conditional dependencies
in space (a hierarchy of part–whole relationships) [161]. Additionally, biological networks involve
state changes that follow a hierarchy of conditional dependencies in time (i.e. causal order, or
directionality). Both hierarchies need to be accounted for in order to obtain an idea of the hierar-
chical order of nodes or clusters in scale invariant network structures. Perhaps the most formal
definition of hierarchy is provided by Corominas-Murtra et al. [40]. The authors propose to quantify
hierarchy in terms of three key elements, which include treeness (pyramidical shape, or bottleneck
structure), feedforwardness (top-down or bottom-up directionalities) and orderability (the eect
of causal cycles), allowing the hierarchical structure of dierent types of networks to be directly
compared within a single three-dimensional space. This definition of hierarchy also controls for
the nestedness and directionality of links (causal order, divergence or convergence), but needs to
be adapted for weighted networks. Perhaps a more straight-forward approach to measuring the
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number of hierarchical levels of a biological network structure would be to count the number of
nested relationships between clusters and subclusters (i.e. scale levels) regardless of directionality
[92]. The number of functionally segregated subclusters that are integrated in a nested fashion into
a particular hierarchy of control provides ameasure of the height of a hierarchical tree [146]. Several
hierarchical network clustering algorithms exist that can provide information on the number of
part-whole relationships, allowing for the construction of corresponding tree-graphs (e.g. [105]).
Measures of nestedness should be intimately tied to the proportion of functional integration versus
segregation of network clusters. This relationship can be tested quantitatively by using another
measure derived from neuroscience, called neural complexity (CN; [167, 205]). This measure defines
functional segregation as the relative statistical independence of small clusters of a system and
functional integration as significant deviations from independence of larger clusters. CN expresses
the average deviation from statistical independence for clusters of increasing size. CN values are
high when functional segregation and integration coexist in a balanced manner and low when
the components of a system are either completely independent (segregated) or completely de-
pendent (integrated). Although first used to analyze neural networks, this measure captures a
universal feature of biological systems [167]. Although this is a structural measure, it may well serve
as a means to quantify Bayesian model complexity, which involves the number of independent
variables (degrees of freedom) that are incorporated in a particular model. Model complexity is
expected to decreasewhenmoving up the hierarchy of generativemodels, since higher levelmodels
oer a more parsimonious explanation of lower-order events [189]. Other measures to quantify
information integration and corresponding fitness have been suggested, e.g. Edlund et al. [49].
Together, these measures of (nested) hierarchical order and model complexity can be used
to test predictions with respect to the comprehensiveness of hierarchical control in biological
networks. We expect the amount of hierarchical integration across multiple contextual cues (and
the corresponding height of the nested hierarchical tree) to dier between lower (less) and higher
(more) organisms, and individuals or species with smaller (less) and larger (more) amounts of
parental investment, solitary (less) andmore social (more) behavior, less (less) andmore (more)
prosocial behavior, less (less) andmore (more) normative (law abiding) or moral behavior, and be-
tween calm (more) and stressful (less) situations (see below). Such dierences may involve specific
parts of the network, e.g. throughput hierarchies may show greater extensions than perceptive
or output hierarchies. As discussed, the height of a hierarchical tree is related to the ability of an
organism to control its internal states and the world around it. Organisms with lesser hierarchies
may find itmore diicult to adapt to complex and changing environments. In the specifically human
case, the maturation of deep goal hierarchies in humans can be linked to personality development,
and insuicient maturation of hierarchical trees to personality disorders and instability (mental
illness). Such deficits eventually decrease scores on measures of self models (agency), social mod-
els (communion) and normative models (meaning). Future studies may compare the hierarchical
network structure of subjects with and without personality disorders to further test these predic-
tions, e.g. using neuroimaging techniques. As observed in section 4, individual dierences in the
maturation of control hierarchies can also be linked to individual dierences in social interaction. At
the macrolevel, social networks may follow the same principles of network structure and function
as shown in Figures 6 and 8.
As a general remark, hierarchical Bayesian inference describes a mechanism for inferring ‘signs
out of signs’ (e.g. humans as symbolic animals), which amounts to amodel of semiotics [53]. Social
connections canbedefined in termsof theexchangeof freeenergybetweendierentagents through
synchronized action-perception cycles and have produced a novel way of thinking about reciprocity
and hermeneutics [62, 210]. Organismsmay act in such as way as to alter the amount of free energy
(model error, stress) in other beings. This corresponds to aiding other organismwith information or
hampering them by not sharing information or providing disinformation, which has a strong moral
Goekoop & De Kleijn | Higher goals from a hierarchical Bayesian control systems perspective 28
connotation. The current paper sees hierarchical Bayesian inference as a way to explain our highest
levels of mental functioning, including the formation of social norms andmoral goals. Individuals
may dier in the degree to which suchmodels have developed and therefore dier in the degree
to which their behavior is guided by higher moral principles. Such topics have been kept to the
realms of philosophy for many thousands of years. Especially as regards moral functioning, one
should be careful not to commit to a naturalistic fallacy by assuming that the factual structure and
dynamics of biological systems automatically informs us of a desirable structure [137]. Although
one should be prudent, however, it is not impossible tomove from facts (‘is’) to moral prescriptions
(‘ought’), especially when such facts involve things of a hierarchical generative and symbolic nature.
The relative autonomy of high-level generative models with respect to the lower-level events from
which they have been inferred makes it possible to produce highly creative models that go well
beyond the available facts, yet are highly successful in predicting events. This relative disconnection
may be what is required to finally integrate science andmorality safely within a single discipline
(the ‘moral sciences’; [169]). This being said, it may well be a (categorical) imperative for all people
to develop mature regulatory hierarchies that incorporate as many contextual cues as possible
into self-transcending world models that allow our behavior to be informed by universal laws
and social rules through which people may connect across nations, cultures and timescales. The
detrimental eects of (chronic) stress on such a development should be actively countered across
many generations.
5.2 Stressful conditions
Organisms continuously change their wiring patternswhile anticipating and responding to dierent
situations. This produces a dynamic balance between the functional segregation and integration of
network communities and, therefore, hierarchical structure [190]. In this paper, we propose that
severe stress alters the network connectivity of biological systems in a universal way, i.e. it should
produce a shutdown of hub structures within high level integrative structures of the organism. This
reduces the amount of functional integration versus segregation as well as the height of the nested
hierarchical tree (see above). Such changes may not cause a significant shi in the small worldness
measure, but may aect measures of modularity and, therefore, nested hierarchy. We expect
stress to decrease the height of nested hierarchical trees as measured by hierarchical clustering
algorithms in areas that harbor high-level goal states. Also, we expectmeasures of (neural ormodel)
complexity to be high in moderately stressful situations and low under either very low or very
high levels of stress (i.e. either complete segregation or integration). Severe stress should produce
shorter, shallower and narrower bow tie motifs, which interferes with the ability of organisms to
compress information. This should translate into increasingly smaller loops that run from input via
processing to output parts of a network. This can be tested by measuring the path length measure
from input to output structures for dierent nodes of interest (i.e. the average distance from one
node to another via a subset of intermediate nodes).
Additionally, we expect stress to alter network connectivity in ways that allow for the cate-
gorization of stress-levels into discrete stages, each with distinct and quantifiable features (for a
similar attempt, see [166]). ‘Low’ amounts of stress (prediction error) should be associated with
low-level action–perception cycles, i.e. activity of short loops within the nested hierarchy ([0] Ha-
bitual behavior, eortless control). This reflects the successful suppression of low-level ascending
and excitatory prediction errors by relatively low-level top-down and inhibitory predictive struc-
tures. When stress levels rise to mild or moderate levels, we expect loops of increasing length,
which represent the top-down suppression of low-level prediction error by increasingly higher-level
generative models to solve more complex challenges ([1] explorative behavior, creative problem
solving). This should translate into the activity of increasingly high-level predictive structures with
top-down (descending) inhibitory connections to subordinate structures (e.g. high-level FFLs, Box
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1). In contrast, we expect the activity of higher hierarchical levels (and the corresponding amount
of top-down inhibitive connections or FFLs) to decrease again when stress levels become severe.
This reflects the dissolution of higher level goal states when the hierarchy is taxed to its limits ([2]
emergency or stringent responses, shutdown of integrative hubs, functional segregation). Thus,
both low and severe levels of stress should engage shorter loopswith corresponding habitual rather
than goal-directed forms of behavior. Predictions with respect to changes in the directionality of
network connections under dierent levels of stress can be tested using the quantitative measures
described above (e.g. causal modeling and/or phase transfer entropy). The final two stages involve
an undercontrolled state of critical slowing down ([3] CSD), which itself predicts a loss of functional
or structural integrity ([4] tipping points/decompensation). Both of these stages can be identified
objectively [107].
So far, few studies have examined how stress aects measures of hierarchy, (neural or model)
complexity and directed connectivity in living organisms. In the specifically human case, severe
stress does appear to decrease the amount of functional integration within the human brain,
as measured by an information processing eiciency measure [167, 218]. Another study in post-
traumatic stress syndrome reports increased amounts of functional segregation [228]. Yet other
studies show that the human brain falls back from goal-directed to habitual control during stress
[175, 174]. Such findings are in line with a collapse of high-level integrative control. When stress
levels are particularly high, we expect tell-tale signs of undercontrolled control systems in the
form of critical slowing down (CSD). As observed, dierent heights of the hierarchical trees may
explain individual dierences in the susceptibility to CSD and actual decompensation (tipping
points). This can be tested by linking the CSD threshold to measures of hierarchical complexity in
dierent individuals or species. Such studies are readily performed in bacteria and other microbes,
where e.g. acidity or salinity levels may be varied to examine bacterial stringent responses and
survival [120, 225]. For obvious reasons, however, such studies cannot be easily translated to higher
organisms. Actively inducing a state of CSD or decompensation in humans or higher primateswould
be highly unethical. However, studies of mental illness may provide a natural situation in which to
examine individual dierences in the susceptibility to CSD (mental illness) in relation to hierarchical
complexity. Indeed, a loss of hierarchical organization (high level frontal hubs) has been reported
in certain forms of mental illness, e.g. [19]. As discussed in section 4, we expect a stagnation of
personality development and the concomitant risk of acute mental illness (psychopathology) to
involve a failure of higher-level hierarchical structures to mature properly. A temporary collapse of
the neurofunctional hierarchy with respect to a previously attained level of functioning should be a
factor common to all episodes of psychopathology. Finally, it would be interesting to examine to
what degree the network structure of the humanmental phenotype (inner experience and overt
behavior) echoes the network structure of hierarchical message passing as shown in Figures 6 and
8. Phenotypical networks indeed show signs of small worldness and nested modular hierarchy
(part–whole relationships), which can be explained by physical network architectures capable
of hierarchical Bayesian inference. Additionally, one could examine to what degree hierarchical
generative models (such as Figure 9) can predict the weight and direction of links in phenotypical
networks. A similar approach can be tried in social networks. Here, agent-based simulations could
aid in understanding patterns of social interaction at the local level (e.g. mutual aection or social
conflict) as well as global phenomena such as innovation and rumor diusion, voting, migration,
strikes, riot behavior, economic slowdown and warfare.
An interesting approachwouldbe to simulate changes in theperformanceof hierarchical control
systemsunder dierent levels of stress using artificial systems (e.g. informationbottleneck systems).
Such studies would allow testing of the hypothesis whether cumulative prediction error (excess free
energy) eventually shuts down connective hub structures at higher level levels within the nested
hierarchy (the knots of the bow ties) when energy demand exceeds energy supply [73]. This should
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lead to a top-down dissolution of integrative control, causing the system to fall back on routine
rather than goal-directed behavior. The loss of higher level predictive (inhibitive) constraint should
produce a state of disinhibition at lower hierarchical levels. Such studies would be a safe way to
study the development of CSD and tipping points (decompensation) as a function of hierarchical
complexity, providing a general model for individual dierences in the susceptibility to disease or
death. Incidentally, such a model would provide a mechanistic account of the workings of natural
selection on organisms that lack adaptive capacity and, thus, link to studies of evolutionary biology.
5.3 Modeling organisms: a unified theoretical framework
One of the most interesting features of living systems is that they follow scale-independent rules of
network structure and function that apply to all organisms. Such universalitymeans that organisms
of any type can bemodeled using a minimum set of building blocks under a common theoretical
framework. Scholars will not have tomake uniquemodels for each organism separately, or for each
level of observation within the organism (e.g. genetic, cellular, systems level, or social). Organisms
canbedescribed in termsof a limited set of networkmotifs [4], allowing for compression of datasets.
Additionally, scale invariance means that organisms can be modeled either in all their intricate
detail (i.e. the full hierarchy of part-whole relationships) or rather more grossly, as a few global
motifs that together perform some global functions, without losing toomuch information (Figure
10).
Figure 10. The scale invariance of biological networks proves useful for modeling organisms. The same
network motifs appear at dierent scale levels of organization, where they support similar functions. For
example, red squares indicate the same structural network motif (a bow tie structure) at dierent spatial
scale levels of observation. Modeling organisms would only require knowledge of the positions and scale
levels of a particular type of motif throughout the organism, allowing for significant parsimony of description
(i.e. organisms can be ‘compressed’ and ‘decompressed’). The fractal-like structure of biological networks
means that this figure may reduce to Figure 1 at the highest spatial scale level of observation (the level of the
individual organism) without losing much information. See text for further details.
5.4 How biology may informmachine learning
So far, we have discussed how artificial intelligence can help us to understand biological networks
in terms of hierarchical Bayesian control systems. Conversely, onemay examine how biological
systemsmay inform computer models of hierarchical control systems. For instance, deep networks
usually startoutwith randomconnections that changeaer learning. Eventually, the ideaof learning
is to connect some input (e.g. a series of pixels that together form the shape of a cat) to a desired
output (say, the succession of letters (C-A-T) in a non-random fashion by means of a hierarchically
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organized throughput area that makes these connections. We have seen that such association are
significantly improved when allowing for a hierarchical structure of input, throughput and output
modules (section 2.2). Since small world networks are non-randomly wired networks that form
spontaneously when optimizing the flow of energy through random networks [89], we predict
that present-day hierarchical deep networks, when performing at optimal eiciency, must have
approached a scale invariant, small world network structure. Currently, we know of no studies
that have examined existing deep networks directly for small worldness. Interestingly, a recent
study found that fitting a deep network with small world network architecture prior to learning
significantly enhanced its performance, thanks to the rapid convergence of microstates onto hub
states [90]. A further improvement can be made by fitting deep networks with bottleneck (bow
tie) structure prior to learning [178]. Such structures appear to be related to phylogenetic learning
(evolution) rather than ontogenetic learning (within-lifespan individual development), hence their
introduction may significantly boost system performance by skipping a generic (phylogenetic)
learning process, allowing the system to directly proceed with task-relevant (ontogenetic) learning
instead. Informationbottlenecksmayalsoprove crucial in studiesof hierarchical Bayesian inference.
Interestingly, the objective function used for the free energy principle (i.e. variational free energy)
can be cast in terms of compressing and minimum description lengths [57, 114, 115, 196, 214].
Given the ubiquitous presence of small world and bottleneck networks in nature, we expect that
such features will soon be detected in hierarchical deep learning systems and that the formation
of such structures correlates positively with the performance of such systems. Indeed, the very
structure of deep networks necessarily entails a kind of bowtie structure—most evident in things
like variational autoencoders [227]. Overall, it is interesting to note that the network architectures
that predominate in machine learning (e.g. deep convolution neural networks) conform almost
exactly to the principles thatwe have been exposing, e.g. they have an explicit hierarchical structure
with a certain kind of sparsity. This is particularly evident in the bottleneck or bow tie architectures
of variational autoencoders that arguably represent the state-of-the-art in deep learning.
As a final remark, biological systemsmay inspire machine learning techniques with respect to
the generic response they show to severe stress and the overtaxing of their hierarchies of control.
Lowering integrative control at the cost of contextual integration may be an answer in situations
that require rapid decisions. This may speed up system performance in dire situations, e.g. when
used in military situations, self driving cars or policing. The prospect of ‘stressed robots’ that
weigh selfish and selfless goals may seem somewhat far-fetched, but may ultimately prove to
be of significant value. For instance, robots may be programmed to never abandon higher level
(normative) goals over lower level (self-centered or social) goals in relevant situations, eectively
causing them to remainmorally just and impartial, or to self-sacrifice (fail for the global good) under
stressful conditions.
6 Conclusion
To conclude, we have examined how biological network systems have structural features that allow
them to function as hierarchical Bayesian control systems. Such systems have generic ways of
producing behavior and responding to stress, which may prove useful in understanding animal
as well as human behavior. Biology on the other hand keeps on inspiring man-made systems, for
which we have made some suggestions.
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